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Case Summaries
Actions, Secured Property, Malpractice

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In this legal malpractice case, based upon an attorney’s not filing a continuation of a financing statement, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirms the trial court’s actions over plaintiff’s objections.

Borley Storage & Transfer Co. v. Whitted, 271 Neb. 84 (2006)

Supreme Court Headnotes

Rules of Evidence:

- [Appeal and Error.] A trial court's decision to admit habit evidence based on opinion under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-406 (Reissue 1995) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

- [Words and Phrases.] Relevant evidence, as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1995), is that which tends to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Jury Instructions:

- [Appeal and Error.] In reviewing a claim of prejudice from instructions given or refused, an appellate court must read the instructions together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and evidence, there is no prejudicial error. ••• The general rule is that whenever applicable, the Nebraska Jury Instructions are to be used.

Malpractice:

- [Attorney and Client:] (Negligence: Proof: Proximate Cause: Damages.) In civil legal malpractice actions, a plaintiff alleging attorney negligence must prove three elements: (1) the attorney's employment, (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty, and (3) that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss (damages) to the client.

Pleadings:

- [Appeal and Error.] As a general rule, an appellate court disposes of a case on the theory presented in the district court.

Damages.

- Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which is another name for the failure to mitigate damages, a wronged party will be denied recovery for such losses as could reasonably have been avoided, although such party will be allowed to recover any loss, injury, or expense incurred in reasonable efforts to minimize the injury. ••• A plaintiff's failure to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages bars recovery, not in toto, but only for the damages which might have been avoided by reasonable efforts.

Appeal and Error.

- Errors that are assigned but not argued will not be addressed by an appellate court.

Date Filed and Case No.: March 3, 2006. No. S-04-708.

Internet Address: http://court.nol.org/opinions/2006/march/mar3/s04-708.htm

Court Appealed From: District Court for Adams County: Stephen Illingworth, Judge.

Attorneys for the Appeal: John H. Marsh for Borley Storage and Transfer Co., Inc., appellant. Bradley D. Holbrook for Warren R. Whitted, Jr., appellee.

Justices: Hendry, C.J., Wright, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack, and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

Not Participating: Connolly, J.

Authored By: Stephan, J.

Summary: This legal malpractice action is before this court for the second time. In the first appearance, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the district court erred in entering partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and therefore reversed and vacated the judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Borley Storage & Transfer Co. v. Whitted, 265 Neb. 533, 657 N.W.2d 911 (2003). Following remand, the cause was tried to a jury.

On 12/10/82, Borley Storage entered into an agreement to sell its business to Borley Moving and Storage, Inc. (Borley Moving), a new entity formed by the longtime manager of Borley Storage, Dennis Bauder, and his wife. William Whitted, Jr. represented Borley Storage in the seller-financed transaction and prepared all of the documents related to the sale of the business. Pursuant to the purchase agreement and to provide security for the transaction, Borley Moving granted Borley Storage a security interest in the personal property, rolling stock, and accounts receivable associated with the business. Borley Moving also granted Borley Storage a first deed of trust in certain real property. Whitted prepared and filed a mortgage and a financing statement to perfect the security interests in the personal property and accounts receivable. The financing statement was filed on 07/12/83. By operation of law, this security interest lapsed on 07/12/88 and no continuation statement was filed.

Borley Moving defaulted on the purchase agreement in 1991, and Borley Storage thereafter attempted to recover by foreclosing on the real estate and recovering the collateral. Borley Moving filed bankruptcy in 1993. The bankruptcy court approved a reorganization plan in 1995, and Borley Storage's claim was valued at $308,000. Approximately $140,000 was secured by the real estate and rolling stock. However, because a second creditor had filed a financing statement with respect to the personal property on which Borley Storage failed to file a continuation statement. As a result, Borley Storage lost its priority with respect to the personal property and accounts receivable. Instead, the second creditor received approximately $64,000 based on its secured interest. Borley Storage never sought recovery from the Bauders on the promissory note.

In this legal malpractice action, Borley Storage and Transfer Co., Inc. (Borley Storage) alleged that Warren R. Whitted, Jr., negligently failed to file or advise its officers of the need to file the continuation statement necessary to preserve the priority of its security interest in the personal property and accounts receivable associated with the business, thus depriving Borley Storage of security valued at $106,000. Whitted denied that he was negligent, and he alleged as an affirmative defense that Borley Storage failed to mitigate its claimed damages. After trial, a jury entered a verdict in favor of Whitted. Following entry of judgment on the jury verdict and denial of its motion seeking alternative forms of postjudgment relief, Borley Storage appealed and the case was moved to the docket of the Nebraska Supreme Court.

Over the objection of Borley Storage, gave an instruction to the jury that the failure to file the continuation statement, did not relieve the Bauders of their obligation to pay the indebtedness created by the promissory note. The Court said that the only reasonable inference which could be drawn from the record was that the Bauders were principal obligors of the promissory note, not accommodation parties, and thus could not have asserted an impairment of collateral defense to a claim on the note. “Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining as a matter of law that the Bauders were personally liable on the note notwithstanding the failure to file a continuation statement, and in so instructing the jury” said the Court.

Borley Storage contended that the district court erred in receiving certain evidence on, and instructing the jury with respect to, the affirmative defense of mitigation of damages. Borley Storage argued that as a secured creditor, it had a right to choose whether to sue on the promissory note or proceed against the collateral and they contended that it "clearly elected to recover its collateral, and did not then, nor has it since, ever sought a dollar judgment against any maker of the note." It characterized the instant action for attorney malpractice as "merely an extension" of its efforts to recover the value of its collateral and argued that Whitted, who is alleged to have caused the loss of collateral, should not be permitted "to dictate the manner in which the secured creditor seeks to recover its losses upon default." The Court reminded that this is not a proceeding to enforce a creditor's remedy under the Uniform Commercial Code but rather, a legal malpractice action governed by principles of tort law. Examining prior Nebraska law, the Court found it was clear that the lapse of the security interest in 1988 did not automatically result in any damage to Borley Storage. “Had the Bauders, as comakers, made timely payments on the note, the lapse of the security interest would have been of no consequence.” The loss of the security interest deprived Borley Storage of one of its remedies in the event of default by Borley Moving, but it did not extinguish the alternative remedy of enforcing the Bauders' personal liability on the note.

With that background, the Court turned to the specific assignments of error pertaining to mitigation of damages. Read together, the Court found that the instructions complained of clearly inform the jury that it could find Whitted liable only for those damages which could not have been avoided by reasonable steps to mitigate.

Here, Whitted testified that he did not have a specific recollection of informing either Harry Borley or Maxine Borley of the need to file a continuation statement within 5 years of filing the original financing statement. Over an objection that he lacked personal knowledge, Whitted was permitted to testify as to his habit and custom in advising parties in seller-financed transactions.

Borley Storage contends that the district court erred in receiving this testimony over its objection. The Court said this error grew from § 27-406 (habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization). Here, Whitted testified that he has practiced law in Nebraska since 1974, focusing his practice on real estate and corporate transactional law, including the sale of businesses of all sizes. Although Borley Storage argued that Whitted did not provide a specific number of transactions in which he had been professionally involved or the details of any specific transaction, the Court concluded that this goes to the weight to be given to his testimony and not to its admissibility. There was no error in the admission of the testimony. AFFIRMED.


Appeal and Error, 1st Degree Murder, Assistance of Counsel

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In this appeal of a jury conviction for first degree murder and the subsequent sentencing, appellant assigned the following errors: (1) He was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) His conviction is not supported by the evidence, (3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. The Nebraska Supreme Court found no error and affirmed.

State v. Aldaco, 271 Neb. 160 (2006)

Supreme Court Headnotes

Effectiveness of Counsel:

- [Appeal and Error.] Appellate review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. ••• When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court reviews the factual findings of the lower court for clear error.

- [Proof.] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his or her defense.

Right to Counsel:

- [Conflict of Interest:] (Appeal and Error.) Whether a defendant's lawyer's representation violates a defendant's right to representation free from conflicts of interest is a mixed question of law and fact that an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court's decision.

Constitutional Law:

- [Conflict of Interest:] (Effectiveness of Counsel: Words and Phrases.) An "actual conflict of interest," for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance.

Criminal Law:

- [Convictions:] (Evidence: Appeal and Error.) When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

••• In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction.

- [Evidence:] (Intent.) When the sufficiency of the evidence as to criminal intent is questioned, independent evidence of specific intent is not required. Rather, the intent with which an act is committed is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident.

Verdicts:

- [Appeal and Error.] Only where evidence lacks sufficient probative force as a matter of law may an appellate court set aside a guilty verdict as unsupported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Homicide:

- [Intent.] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303 (Reissue 1995), a specific intent to kill is not required to constitute felony murder, only the intent to do the act which constitutes the felony in question.

Sentences:

- An abuse of discretion occurs when a sentencing court's reasoning or rulings are clearly untenable and unfairly deprive the litigant of a substantial right and a just result. ••• In considering a sentence to be imposed, the sentencing court is not limited in its discretion to any mathematically applied set of factors. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge's observation of the defendant's demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's life. ••• Factors a judge should consider in imposing a sentence include the defendant's age, mentality, education, experience, and social and cultural background, as well as his or her past criminal record or law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.

- [Appeal and Error.] A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Speedy Trial.

- If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to his or her absolute discharge from the offense charged.

Final Orders:

- [Speedy Trial:] (Notice: Appeal and Error.) Where a motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds is submitted to a trial court, that motion is inferentially denied where the trial court proceeds to trial without expressly ruling on the motion. At that point, the denial of the defendant's motion is a final, appealable order, and the defendant must secure his or her rights to appellate review by filing a timely notice of appeal.

Date Filed and Case No.: March 3, 2006. No. S-05-587.

Internet Address: http://court.nol.org/opinions/2006/march/mar3/s05-587.htm

Court Appealed From: District Court for Douglas County: Joseph S. Troia, Judge.

Attorneys for the Appeal: Mark A. Weber and Kylie A. Wolf for Samson Aldaco, appellant. Jon Bruning, Don Kleine, and Michael W. Jensen for State of Nebraska, appellee.

Justices: Hendry, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack, and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

Authored By: McCormack, J.

Summary: Samson Aldaco was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, possession of a deadly weapon by a felon, and possession of a controlled substance for his actions on December 7, 2001. Aldaco was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in the first degree, 10 years' imprisonment for use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, 10 years' imprisonment for possession of a deadly weapon by a felon, and 1 year's imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance. Aldaco appealed his convictions and sentences.

Testimony adduced at trial established that in December 2001, Aldaco and four accomplices, one of whom was Ray Lara, traveled from Garden City, Kansas, to Omaha, Nebraska, to collect money owed to him from his illegal drug business. After the five entered a residence where the debtors from the drug business were located, the victims were robbed at gunpoint while lying face down on the basement floor. Upon entering the basement, Lara began yelling at the individuals on the floor, demanded their wallets, and kicked and pistol-whipped them as he patted them down. Stace Straw, one of the victims on the floor who was being patted down, began to struggle with Lara. During this altercation, Lara fatally shot Straw in the head. After Lara shot Straw, the men left the residence and eventually met at a casino in Iowa, pursuant to Aldaco's instructions. In traveling around Omaha after splitting up with two of his accomplices, Aldaco was pulled over by Omaha police for driving without his headlights illuminated. The officer was subsequently advised that the vehicle and occupants matched the description of the vehicle and individuals involved in an earlier shooting. After assistance arrived, officers conducted a high-risk felony stop and the three men in the vehicle were arrested. Upon searching the vehicle, officers found handguns and a baggie containing a white, powdery substance which tested positive for 17.2 grams of methamphetamine and dimethyl sulfone.

The State filed an information charging Aldaco with murder in the first degree. A variety of attorney withdrawals, motions to suppress, appeals thereof, and violations of the speedy trial statute were filed. After being remanded, on 01/02/04, Aldaco filed a motion to discharge on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Aldaco's trial commenced on January 5 where the court orally overruled Aldaco's motion to discharge, but did not enter a written order to that effect. The matter was then tried before a jury which found Aldaco guilty of all charges. Adalco appealed.

On appeal, Aldaco assigned the following errors: (1) Aldaco was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) Aldaco's conviction is not supported by the evidence, (3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling Aldaco's motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds.

In his first assignment of error, Aldaco claims the trial court erred in finding that Aldaco's defense counsel competently represented him at trial. Here, Aldaco contended that defense counsel was ineffective in that the attorney had a conflict of interest due to the attorney's prior representation of Straw's brother in an unrelated matter. Aldaco also contends that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because the trial court failed to inquire into the alleged conflict of interest. The Court’s review of the record clearly demonstrated that the trial court inquired into the potential conflict of interest stemming from defense counsel's prior representation of Straw's brother and that the court reasonably concluded that the prior representation did not create a conflict of interest. “Based upon our review of the record, we find no evidence that counsel was affected by a conflict of interest. Thus, there is no evidence that counsel's performance was deficient, nor is there any basis for a presumption of prejudice pursuant to Cuyler v. Sullivan, (446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980)).”

In his second assignment of error, Aldaco claimed that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder. Aldaco was charged with first degree murder for the death of Straw based upon either deliberate and premeditated murder or death during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. On appeal, Aldaco specifically contended the evidence fails to establish that a robbery was intended or that there was a plan to hurt or kill anyone. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court found that the record reflected that Aldaco orchestrated a plan whereby he and his colleagues drove to Omaha in order to collect money owed to Aldaco. Pursuant to a request by Aldaco, all five men carried with them either their own gun or a gun provided by Aldaco. In the basement, Straw and the other individuals were forced to lie face down on the floor and were ordered not to move, or they would be killed. While these individuals were lying on the floor, money was demanded of them and their wallets were taken. Thereafter, Lara began physically assaulting the individuals and ultimately shot and killed Straw. “Based on the evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that a robbery was committed and that the essential elements of the crime of first degree murder were proved beyond a reasonable doubt” the Court ruled and Aldaco's second assignment of error was, therefore, without merit.

Aldaco next claimed that the trial court erred in the sentencing. Aldaco argued that the trial court failed to consider his age, mentality, education, experience, social and cultural background, past criminal record, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, amount of violence involved in the crime, and his character. The Court noted that the crimes involved in the instant case involved a violent, senseless incident which resulted in the death of an individual. As noted by the trial court, while Aldaco may not have pulled the trigger, it was he that "put the ball in motion" which led to Straw's death. The trial court, which reviewed the record and was familiar with the circumstances of the case, imposed sentences which are within the statutory limitations. “Considering the totality of the circumstances,” they ruled “we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentences.”

In his final assignment of error, Aldaco contends he was denied his right to a speedy trial. Pursuant to State v. Ward, 257 Neb. 377, 384, 597 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1999), disapproved on other grounds the Court ruled that the trial court's decision overruling Aldaco's motion to discharge was appealable on 01/05/04 after the court verbally overruled the motion and proceeded to trial. Thereafter, Aldaco had 30 days in which to file an appeal. Although Aldaco filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 2, within the 30-day period, that appeal was dismissed, and Aldaco did not seek further review of that decision with the Nebraska Supreme Court . Regardless of whether Aldaco's February 2 appeal should have been dismissed, both his 05/21/04, and his 05/06/05 appeals are untimely challenges of the denial of his motion to discharge. AFFIRMED.

 

Appeal and Error, 1st Degree Murder, Sentencing

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In this appeal of a jury conviction for first degree murder and the subsequent sentencing, appellant assigned the following errors: (1) He was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) His conviction is not supported by the evidence, (3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. The Nebraska Supreme Court found no error and affirmed.

State v. Aldaco, 271 Neb. 160 (2006)

Supreme Court Headnotes

Effectiveness of Counsel:

- [Appeal and Error.] Appellate review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. ••• When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court reviews the factual findings of the lower court for clear error.

- [Proof.] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his or her defense.

Right to Counsel:

- [Conflict of Interest:] (Appeal and Error.) Whether a defendant's lawyer's representation violates a defendant's right to representation free from conflicts of interest is a mixed question of law and fact that an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court's decision.

Constitutional Law:

- [Conflict of Interest:] (Effectiveness of Counsel: Words and Phrases.) An "actual conflict of interest," for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance.

Criminal Law:

- [Convictions:] (Evidence: Appeal and Error.) When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

••• In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction.

- [Evidence:] (Intent.) When the sufficiency of the evidence as to criminal intent is questioned, independent evidence of specific intent is not required. Rather, the intent with which an act is committed is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident.

Verdicts:

- [Appeal and Error.] Only where evidence lacks sufficient probative force as a matter of law may an appellate court set aside a guilty verdict as unsupported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Homicide:

- [Intent.] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303 (Reissue 1995), a specific intent to kill is not required to constitute felony murder, only the intent to do the act which constitutes the felony in question.

Sentences:

- An abuse of discretion occurs when a sentencing court's reasoning or rulings are clearly untenable and unfairly deprive the litigant of a substantial right and a just result. ••• In considering a sentence to be imposed, the sentencing court is not limited in its discretion to any mathematically applied set of factors. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge's observation of the defendant's demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's life. ••• Factors a judge should consider in imposing a sentence include the defendant's age, mentality, education, experience, and social and cultural background, as well as his or her past criminal record or law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.

- [Appeal and Error.] A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Speedy Trial.

- If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to his or her absolute discharge from the offense charged.

Final Orders:

- [Speedy Trial:] (Notice: Appeal and Error.) Where a motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds is submitted to a trial court, that motion is inferentially denied where the trial court proceeds to trial without expressly ruling on the motion. At that point, the denial of the defendant's motion is a final, appealable order, and the defendant must secure his or her rights to appellate review by filing a timely notice of appeal.

Date Filed and Case No.: March 3, 2006. No. S-05-587.

Internet Address: http://court.nol.org/opinions/2006/march/mar3/s05-587.htm

Court Appealed From: District Court for Douglas County: Joseph S. Troia, Judge.

Attorneys for the Appeal: Mark A. Weber and Kylie A. Wolf for Samson Aldaco, appellant. Jon Bruning, Don Kleine, and Michael W. Jensen for State of Nebraska, appellee.

Justices: Hendry, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack, and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

Authored By: McCormack, J.

Summary: Samson Aldaco was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, possession of a deadly weapon by a felon, and possession of a controlled substance for his actions on December 7, 2001. Aldaco was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in the first degree, 10 years' imprisonment for use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, 10 years' imprisonment for possession of a deadly weapon by a felon, and 1 year's imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance. Aldaco appealed his convictions and sentences.

Testimony adduced at trial established that in December 2001, Aldaco and four accomplices, one of whom was Ray Lara, traveled from Garden City, Kansas, to Omaha, Nebraska, to collect money owed to him from his illegal drug business. After the five entered a residence where the debtors from the drug business were located, the victims were robbed at gunpoint while lying face down on the basement floor. Upon entering the basement, Lara began yelling at the individuals on the floor, demanded their wallets, and kicked and pistol-whipped them as he patted them down. Stace Straw, one of the victims on the floor who was being patted down, began to struggle with Lara. During this altercation, Lara fatally shot Straw in the head. After Lara shot Straw, the men left the residence and eventually met at a casino in Iowa, pursuant to Aldaco's instructions. In traveling around Omaha after splitting up with two of his accomplices, Aldaco was pulled over by Omaha police for driving without his headlights illuminated. The officer was subsequently advised that the vehicle and occupants matched the description of the vehicle and individuals involved in an earlier shooting. After assistance arrived, officers conducted a high-risk felony stop and the three men in the vehicle were arrested. Upon searching the vehicle, officers found handguns and a baggie containing a white, powdery substance which tested positive for 17.2 grams of methamphetamine and dimethyl sulfone.

The State filed an information charging Aldaco with murder in the first degree. A variety of attorney withdrawals, motions to suppress, appeals thereof, and violations of the speedy trial statute were filed. After being remanded, on 01/02/04, Aldaco filed a motion to discharge on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Aldaco's trial commenced on January 5 where the court orally overruled Aldaco's motion to discharge, but did not enter a written order to that effect. The matter was then tried before a jury which found Aldaco guilty of all charges. Adalco appealed.

On appeal, Aldaco assigned the following errors: (1) Aldaco was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) Aldaco's conviction is not supported by the evidence, (3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling Aldaco's motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds.

In his first assignment of error, Aldaco claims the trial court erred in finding that Aldaco's defense counsel competently represented him at trial. Here, Aldaco contended that defense counsel was ineffective in that the attorney had a conflict of interest due to the attorney's prior representation of Straw's brother in an unrelated matter. Aldaco also contends that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because the trial court failed to inquire into the alleged conflict of interest. The Court’s review of the record clearly demonstrated that the trial court inquired into the potential conflict of interest stemming from defense counsel's prior representation of Straw's brother and that the court reasonably concluded that the prior representation did not create a conflict of interest. “Based upon our review of the record, we find no evidence that counsel was affected by a conflict of interest. Thus, there is no evidence that counsel's performance was deficient, nor is there any basis for a presumption of prejudice pursuant to Cuyler v. Sullivan, (446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980)).”

In his second assignment of error, Aldaco claimed that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder. Aldaco was charged with first degree murder for the death of Straw based upon either deliberate and premeditated murder or death during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. On appeal, Aldaco specifically contended the evidence fails to establish that a robbery was intended or that there was a plan to hurt or kill anyone. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court found that the record reflected that Aldaco orchestrated a plan whereby he and his colleagues drove to Omaha in order to collect money owed to Aldaco. Pursuant to a request by Aldaco, all five men carried with them either their own gun or a gun provided by Aldaco. In the basement, Straw and the other individuals were forced to lie face down on the floor and were ordered not to move, or they would be killed. While these individuals were lying on the floor, money was demanded of them and their wallets were taken. Thereafter, Lara began physically assaulting the individuals and ultimately shot and killed Straw. “Based on the evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that a robbery was committed and that the essential elements of the crime of first degree murder were proved beyond a reasonable doubt” the Court ruled and Aldaco's second assignment of error was, therefore, without merit.

Aldaco next claimed that the trial court erred in the sentencing. Aldaco argued that the trial court failed to consider his age, mentality, education, experience, social and cultural background, past criminal record, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, amount of violence involved in the crime, and his character. The Court noted that the crimes involved in the instant case involved a violent, senseless incident which resulted in the death of an individual. As noted by the trial court, while Aldaco may not have pulled the trigger, it was he that "put the ball in motion" which led to Straw's death. The trial court, which reviewed the record and was familiar with the circumstances of the case, imposed sentences which are within the statutory limitations. “Considering the totality of the circumstances,” they ruled “we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentences.”

In his final assignment of error, Aldaco contends he was denied his right to a speedy trial. Pursuant to State v. Ward, 257 Neb. 377, 384, 597 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1999), disapproved on other grounds the Court ruled that the trial court's decision overruling Aldaco's motion to discharge was appealable on 01/05/04 after the court verbally overruled the motion and proceeded to trial. Thereafter, Aldaco had 30 days in which to file an appeal. Although Aldaco filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 2, within the 30-day period, that appeal was dismissed, and Aldaco did not seek further review of that decision with the Nebraska Supreme Court . Regardless of whether Aldaco's February 2 appeal should have been dismissed, both his 05/21/04, and his 05/06/05 appeals are untimely challenges of the denial of his motion to discharge. AFFIRMED.

 

Appeal and Error, 1st Degree Murder, Sufficiency of Evidence

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In this appeal of a jury conviction for first degree murder and the subsequent sentencing, appellant assigned the following errors: (1) He was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) His conviction is not supported by the evidence, (3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. The Nebraska Supreme Court found no error and affirmed.

State v. Aldaco, 271 Neb. 160 (2006)

Supreme Court Headnotes

Effectiveness of Counsel:

- [Appeal and Error.] Appellate review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. ••• When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court reviews the factual findings of the lower court for clear error.

- [Proof.] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his or her defense.

Right to Counsel:

- [Conflict of Interest:] (Appeal and Error.) Whether a defendant's lawyer's representation violates a defendant's right to representation free from conflicts of interest is a mixed question of law and fact that an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court's decision.

Constitutional Law:

- [Conflict of Interest:] (Effectiveness of Counsel: Words and Phrases.) An "actual conflict of interest," for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance.

Criminal Law:

- [Convictions:] (Evidence: Appeal and Error.) When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

••• In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction.

- [Evidence:] (Intent.) When the sufficiency of the evidence as to criminal intent is questioned, independent evidence of specific intent is not required. Rather, the intent with which an act is committed is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident.

Verdicts:

- [Appeal and Error.] Only where evidence lacks sufficient probative force as a matter of law may an appellate court set aside a guilty verdict as unsupported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Homicide:

- [Intent.] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303 (Reissue 1995), a specific intent to kill is not required to constitute felony murder, only the intent to do the act which constitutes the felony in question.

Sentences:

- An abuse of discretion occurs when a sentencing court's reasoning or rulings are clearly untenable and unfairly deprive the litigant of a substantial right and a just result. ••• In considering a sentence to be imposed, the sentencing court is not limited in its discretion to any mathematically applied set of factors. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge's observation of the defendant's demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's life. ••• Factors a judge should consider in imposing a sentence include the defendant's age, mentality, education, experience, and social and cultural background, as well as his or her past criminal record or law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.

- [Appeal and Error.] A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Speedy Trial.

- If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to his or her absolute discharge from the offense charged.

Final Orders:

- [Speedy Trial:] (Notice: Appeal and Error.) Where a motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds is submitted to a trial court, that motion is inferentially denied where the trial court proceeds to trial without expressly ruling on the motion. At that point, the denial of the defendant's motion is a final, appealable order, and the defendant must secure his or her rights to appellate review by filing a timely notice of appeal.

Date Filed and Case No.: March 3, 2006. No. S-05-587.

Internet Address: http://court.nol.org/opinions/2006/march/mar3/s05-587.htm

Court Appealed From: District Court for Douglas County: Joseph S. Troia, Judge.

Attorneys for the Appeal: Mark A. Weber and Kylie A. Wolf for Samson Aldaco, appellant. Jon Bruning, Don Kleine, and Michael W. Jensen for State of Nebraska, appellee.

Justices: Hendry, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack, and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

Authored By: McCormack, J.

Summary: Samson Aldaco was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, possession of a deadly weapon by a felon, and possession of a controlled substance for his actions on December 7, 2001. Aldaco was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in the first degree, 10 years' imprisonment for use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, 10 years' imprisonment for possession of a deadly weapon by a felon, and 1 year's imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance. Aldaco appealed his convictions and sentences.

Testimony adduced at trial established that in December 2001, Aldaco and four accomplices, one of whom was Ray Lara, traveled from Garden City, Kansas, to Omaha, Nebraska, to collect money owed to him from his illegal drug business. After the five entered a residence where the debtors from the drug business were located, the victims were robbed at gunpoint while lying face down on the basement floor. Upon entering the basement, Lara began yelling at the individuals on the floor, demanded their wallets, and kicked and pistol-whipped them as he patted them down. Stace Straw, one of the victims on the floor who was being patted down, began to struggle with Lara. During this altercation, Lara fatally shot Straw in the head. After Lara shot Straw, the men left the residence and eventually met at a casino in Iowa, pursuant to Aldaco's instructions. In traveling around Omaha after splitting up with two of his accomplices, Aldaco was pulled over by Omaha police for driving without his headlights illuminated. The officer was subsequently advised that the vehicle and occupants matched the description of the vehicle and individuals involved in an earlier shooting. After assistance arrived, officers conducted a high-risk felony stop and the three men in the vehicle were arrested. Upon searching the vehicle, officers found handguns and a baggie containing a white, powdery substance which tested positive for 17.2 grams of methamphetamine and dimethyl sulfone.

The State filed an information charging Aldaco with murder in the first degree. A variety of attorney withdrawals, motions to suppress, appeals thereof, and violations of the speedy trial statute were filed. After being remanded, on 01/02/04, Aldaco filed a motion to discharge on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Aldaco's trial commenced on January 5 where the court orally overruled Aldaco's motion to discharge, but did not enter a written order to that effect. The matter was then tried before a jury which found Aldaco guilty of all charges. Adalco appealed.

On appeal, Aldaco assigned the following errors: (1) Aldaco was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) Aldaco's conviction is not supported by the evidence, (3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling Aldaco's motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds.

In his first assignment of error, Aldaco claims the trial court erred in finding that Aldaco's defense counsel competently represented him at trial. Here, Aldaco contended that defense counsel was ineffective in that the attorney had a conflict of interest due to the attorney's prior representation of Straw's brother in an unrelated matter. Aldaco also contends that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because the trial court failed to inquire into the alleged conflict of interest. The Court’s review of the record clearly demonstrated that the trial court inquired into the potential conflict of interest stemming from defense counsel's prior representation of Straw's brother and that the court reasonably concluded that the prior representation did not create a conflict of interest. “Based upon our review of the record, we find no evidence that counsel was affected by a conflict of interest. Thus, there is no evidence that counsel's performance was deficient, nor is there any basis for a presumption of prejudice pursuant to Cuyler v. Sullivan, (446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980)).”

In his second assignment of error, Aldaco claimed that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder. Aldaco was charged with first degree murder for the death of Straw based upon either deliberate and premeditated murder or death during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. On appeal, Aldaco specifically contended the evidence fails to establish that a robbery was intended or that there was a plan to hurt or kill anyone. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court found that the record reflected that Aldaco orchestrated a plan whereby he and his colleagues drove to Omaha in order to collect money owed to Aldaco. Pursuant to a request by Aldaco, all five men carried with them either their own gun or a gun provided by Aldaco. In the basement, Straw and the other individuals were forced to lie face down on the floor and were ordered not to move, or they would be killed. While these individuals were lying on the floor, money was demanded of them and their wallets were taken. Thereafter, Lara began physically assaulting the individuals and ultimately shot and killed Straw. “Based on the evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that a robbery was committed and that the essential elements of the crime of first degree murder were proved beyond a reasonable doubt” the Court ruled and Aldaco's second assignment of error was, therefore, without merit.

Aldaco next claimed that the trial court erred in the sentencing. Aldaco argued that the trial court failed to consider his age, mentality, education, experience, social and cultural background, past criminal record, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, amount of violence involved in the crime, and his character. The Court noted that the crimes involved in the instant case involved a violent, senseless incident which resulted in the death of an individual. As noted by the trial court, while Aldaco may not have pulled the trigger, it was he that "put the ball in motion" which led to Straw's death. The trial court, which reviewed the record and was familiar with the circumstances of the case, imposed sentences which are within the statutory limitations. “Considering the totality of the circumstances,” they ruled “we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentences.”

In his final assignment of error, Aldaco contends he was denied his right to a speedy trial. Pursuant to State v. Ward, 257 Neb. 377, 384, 597 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1999), disapproved on other grounds the Court ruled that the trial court's decision overruling Aldaco's motion to discharge was appealable on 01/05/04 after the court verbally overruled the motion and proceeded to trial. Thereafter, Aldaco had 30 days in which to file an appeal. Although Aldaco filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 2, within the 30-day period, that appeal was dismissed, and Aldaco did not seek further review of that decision with the Nebraska Supreme Court . Regardless of whether Aldaco's February 2 appeal should have been dismissed, both his 05/21/04, and his 05/06/05 appeals are untimely challenges of the denial of his motion to discharge. AFFIRMED.

 

Appeal and Error, Speedy Trial

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In this appeal of a jury conviction for first degree murder and the subsequent sentencing, appellant assigned the following errors: (1) He was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) His conviction is not supported by the evidence, (3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. The Nebraska Supreme Court found no error and affirmed.

State v. Aldaco, 271 Neb. 160 (2006)

Supreme Court Headnotes

Effectiveness of Counsel:

- [Appeal and Error.] Appellate review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. ••• When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court reviews the factual findings of the lower court for clear error.

- [Proof.] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his or her defense.

Right to Counsel:

- [Conflict of Interest:] (Appeal and Error.) Whether a defendant's lawyer's representation violates a defendant's right to representation free from conflicts of interest is a mixed question of law and fact that an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court's decision.

Constitutional Law:

- [Conflict of Interest:] (Effectiveness of Counsel: Words and Phrases.) An "actual conflict of interest," for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance.

Criminal Law:

- [Convictions:] (Evidence: Appeal and Error.) When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

••• In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction.

- [Evidence:] (Intent.) When the sufficiency of the evidence as to criminal intent is questioned, independent evidence of specific intent is not required. Rather, the intent with which an act is committed is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident.

Verdicts:

- [Appeal and Error.] Only where evidence lacks sufficient probative force as a matter of law may an appellate court set aside a guilty verdict as unsupported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Homicide:

- [Intent.] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303 (Reissue 1995), a specific intent to kill is not required to constitute felony murder, only the intent to do the act which constitutes the felony in question.

Sentences:

- An abuse of discretion occurs when a sentencing court's reasoning or rulings are clearly untenable and unfairly deprive the litigant of a substantial right and a just result. ••• In considering a sentence to be imposed, the sentencing court is not limited in its discretion to any mathematically applied set of factors. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge's observation of the defendant's demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's life. ••• Factors a judge should consider in imposing a sentence include the defendant's age, mentality, education, experience, and social and cultural background, as well as his or her past criminal record or law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.

- [Appeal and Error.] A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Speedy Trial.

- If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to his or her absolute discharge from the offense charged.

Final Orders:

- [Speedy Trial:] (Notice: Appeal and Error.) Where a motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds is submitted to a trial court, that motion is inferentially denied where the trial court proceeds to trial without expressly ruling on the motion. At that point, the denial of the defendant's motion is a final, appealable order, and the defendant must secure his or her rights to appellate review by filing a timely notice of appeal.

Date Filed and Case No.: March 3, 2006. No. S-05-587.

Internet Address: http://court.nol.org/opinions/2006/march/mar3/s05-587.htm

Court Appealed From: District Court for Douglas County: Joseph S. Troia, Judge.

Attorneys for the Appeal: Mark A. Weber and Kylie A. Wolf for Samson Aldaco, appellant. Jon Bruning, Don Kleine, and Michael W. Jensen for State of Nebraska, appellee.

Justices: Hendry, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack, and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

Authored By: McCormack, J.

Summary: Samson Aldaco was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, possession of a deadly weapon by a felon, and possession of a controlled substance for his actions on December 7, 2001. Aldaco was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in the first degree, 10 years' imprisonment for use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, 10 years' imprisonment for possession of a deadly weapon by a felon, and 1 year's imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance. Aldaco appealed his convictions and sentences.

Testimony adduced at trial established that in December 2001, Aldaco and four accomplices, one of whom was Ray Lara, traveled from Garden City, Kansas, to Omaha, Nebraska, to collect money owed to him from his illegal drug business. After the five entered a residence where the debtors from the drug business were located, the victims were robbed at gunpoint while lying face down on the basement floor. Upon entering the basement, Lara began yelling at the individuals on the floor, demanded their wallets, and kicked and pistol-whipped them as he patted them down. Stace Straw, one of the victims on the floor who was being patted down, began to struggle with Lara. During this altercation, Lara fatally shot Straw in the head. After Lara shot Straw, the men left the residence and eventually met at a casino in Iowa, pursuant to Aldaco's instructions. In traveling around Omaha after splitting up with two of his accomplices, Aldaco was pulled over by Omaha police for driving without his headlights illuminated. The officer was subsequently advised that the vehicle and occupants matched the description of the vehicle and individuals involved in an earlier shooting. After assistance arrived, officers conducted a high-risk felony stop and the three men in the vehicle were arrested. Upon searching the vehicle, officers found handguns and a baggie containing a white, powdery substance which tested positive for 17.2 grams of methamphetamine and dimethyl sulfone.

The State filed an information charging Aldaco with murder in the first degree. A variety of attorney withdrawals, motions to suppress, appeals thereof, and violations of the speedy trial statute were filed. After being remanded, on 01/02/04, Aldaco filed a motion to discharge on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Aldaco's trial commenced on January 5 where the court orally overruled Aldaco's motion to discharge, but did not enter a written order to that effect. The matter was then tried before a jury which found Aldaco guilty of all charges. Adalco appealed.

On appeal, Aldaco assigned the following errors: (1) Aldaco was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) Aldaco's conviction is not supported by the evidence, (3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling Aldaco's motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds.

In his first assignment of error, Aldaco claims the trial court erred in finding that Aldaco's defense counsel competently represented him at trial. Here, Aldaco contended that defense counsel was ineffective in that the attorney had a conflict of interest due to the attorney's prior representation of Straw's brother in an unrelated matter. Aldaco also contends that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because the trial court failed to inquire into the alleged conflict of interest. The Court’s review of the record clearly demonstrated that the trial court inquired into the potential conflict of interest stemming from defense counsel's prior representation of Straw's brother and that the court reasonably concluded that the prior representation did not create a conflict of interest. “Based upon our review of the record, we find no evidence that counsel was affected by a conflict of interest. Thus, there is no evidence that counsel's performance was deficient, nor is there any basis for a presumption of prejudice pursuant to Cuyler v. Sullivan, (446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980)).”

In his second assignment of error, Aldaco claimed that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder. Aldaco was charged with first degree murder for the death of Straw based upon either deliberate and premeditated murder or death during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. On appeal, Aldaco specifically contended the evidence fails to establish that a robbery was intended or that there was a plan to hurt or kill anyone. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court found that the record reflected that Aldaco orchestrated a plan whereby he and his colleagues drove to Omaha in order to collect money owed to Aldaco. Pursuant to a request by Aldaco, all five men carried with them either their own gun or a gun provided by Aldaco. In the basement, Straw and the other individuals were forced to lie face down on the floor and were ordered not to move, or they would be killed. While these individuals were lying on the floor, money was demanded of them and their wallets were taken. Thereafter, Lara began physically assaulting the individuals and ultimately shot and killed Straw. “Based on the evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that a robbery was committed and that the essential elements of the crime of first degree murder were proved beyond a reasonable doubt” the Court ruled and Aldaco's second assignment of error was, therefore, without merit.

Aldaco next claimed that the trial court erred in the sentencing. Aldaco argued that the trial court failed to consider his age, mentality, education, experience, social and cultural background, past criminal record, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, amount of violence involved in the crime, and his character. The Court noted that the crimes involved in the instant case involved a violent, senseless incident which resulted in the death of an individual. As noted by the trial court, while Aldaco may not have pulled the trigger, it was he that "put the ball in motion" which led to Straw's death. The trial court, which reviewed the record and was familiar with the circumstances of the case, imposed sentences which are within the statutory limitations. “Considering the totality of the circumstances,” they ruled “we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentences.”

In his final assignment of error, Aldaco contends he was denied his right to a speedy trial. Pursuant to State v. Ward, 257 Neb. 377, 384, 597 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1999), disapproved on other grounds the Court ruled that the trial court's decision overruling Aldaco's motion to discharge was appealable on 01/05/04 after the court verbally overruled the motion and proceeded to trial. Thereafter, Aldaco had 30 days in which to file an appeal. Although Aldaco filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 2, within the 30-day period, that appeal was dismissed, and Aldaco did not seek further review of that decision with the Nebraska Supreme Court . Regardless of whether Aldaco's February 2 appeal should have been dismissed, both his 05/21/04, and his 05/06/05 appeals are untimely challenges of the denial of his motion to discharge. AFFIRMED.

 

Attorney's Lien

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In this case of first impression. brought under the Tort Claims Act, the Nebraska Supreme Court concludes that under the language of § 25-2214.01, when an adverse party pays sums into the office of the clerk of the district court to satisfy a judgment, and prior to the payment of such sums, an attorney's lien has attached to such sums, the district court clerk has a duty without regard to whether the attorney has intervened to retain that portion of the funds to which an attorney's lien has attached until the "rightful owner" of the sums can be determined.

Stover v. County of Lancaster, 271 Neb. 107 (2006)

Supreme Court Headnotes

Courts:

- [Appeal and Error.] The district court and higher appellate courts generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record.

Judgments:

- [Appeal and Error.] When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. ••• In instances when an appellate court is required to review cases for error appearing on the record, questions of law are nonetheless reviewed de novo on the record.

Attorney Fees:

- [Attorneys' Liens:] (Notice.) The purpose of the notice requirement of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-108 (Reissue 1997) is to protect innocent persons who have no notice or knowledge that an attorney claims a lien on the judgment. ••• When an attorney has given appropriate notice of an attorney's lien under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-108 (Reissue 1997), the lien is perfected and attaches to funds in the hands of the adverse party and belonging to the attorney's client. ••• When an adverse party pays into the clerk of the district court such sums as will satisfy a judgment awarded against that party, and prior to the payment of such sums into the court, notice is given and an attorney's lien has attached, the district court clerk who has notice of the lien by virtue of its filing has a duty to retain that portion of the deposited funds to which an attorney's lien has attached until the rightful owner of the sums retained can be determined. When the funds cannot be fully paid out, as part of the clerk's duty to manage such funds, the clerk of the district court should notify those entities of whom the clerk is on notice who have claimed an interest in the funds, of the retention of the funds, to effectuate the determination of the rightful owner. (Liability.) Despite the attachment of an attorney's lien, the adverse party may be relieved from liability on such lien by payment of the judgment into the clerk of the court.

Date Filed and Case No.: March 3, 2006. No. S-04-1108.

Internet Address: http://court.nol.org/opinions/2006/march/mar3/s04-1108.htm

Court Appealed From: District Court for Lancaster County, Karen Flowers, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for Lancaster County, James L. Foster, Judge.

Attorneys for the Appeal: Victor E. Covalt III and Mary C. Gaines for DeAnn C. Stover, appellant. Gary E. Lacey, Douglas D. Cyr, and Nathan Evershed, Senior Certified Law Student, for County of Lancaster, appellee.

Justices: Hendry, C.J., Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack, and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

Participating on Briefs: Wright, J.

Authored By: Miller-Lerman, J.

Summary: DeAnn C. Stover, an attorney, filed a claim against Lancaster County asserting that the clerk of the district court erred when the clerk paid the entirety of the funds deposited by a judgment debtor to the judgment creditor in disregard of an attorney's lien filed by Stover. The Lancaster County Board of Commissioners denied Stover's claim. In subsequent litigation brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-901 et seq. (Reissue 1997 & Cum. Supp. 2002) (Tort Claims Act), the county court ruled in favor of Lancaster County and dismissed Stover's complaint. The district court for Lancaster County concluded the clerk did not owe a duty to Stover and affirmed the county court's decision. Stover appealed from the district court's decision to the Nebraska Supreme Court.

At issue in this appeal is the determination of the duties of the clerk of the district court to preserve funds in a case in which an attorney's lien has been filed. The Court said it had not previously commented on the duties of the clerk under circumstances such as this case. Relevant to the analysis is the attorney's lien statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-108 (Reissue 1997), and the district court clerk's money and property management statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2214.01 (Reissue 1995). On appeal, Stover challenged the district court's conclusion that the clerk of the district court owed no duty to Stover under § 25-2214.01. Specifically, Stover asserted that after she filed her attorney's lien under § 7-108, she had asserted an interest to at least a portion of the funds subsequently paid by the judgment debtor here, Lori Denision, into the clerk's office, and that pursuant to § 25-2214.01, the district court clerk had a duty to retain possession of funds sufficient to satisfy Stover's lien until such time as the rightful ownership of those funds could be determined. “We agree with Stover that under the facts, the clerk owed a duty to Stover” said the Court.

Because Stover filed her attorney's lien prior to Lori's payment of the funds to the district court clerk, at the time Lori paid the judgment into the court, the lien had been perfected by Stover's notice and had attached to the funds. Notwithstanding perfection of Stover's attorney's lien, under the rulings of the Nebraska Supreme Court noted in the opinion, Lori, as the adverse party and judgment debtor, was nevertheless permitted to pay the judgment against her into the district court clerk's office to satisfy the judgment and at the same time be relieved from her obligations under Stover's lien. The Court reminded that it is fundamental that "the proper place to pay a judgment by a judgment debtor is to the clerk of the court in which the judgment is obtained." Myers v. Miller, 134 Neb. 824, 830, 279 N.W. 778, 781 (1938). Here, Lori's payment of the judgment against her into the office of the clerk of the district court relieved Lori from her responsibilities with regard to Stover's attorney's lien.

As to whether under § 25-2214.01, the district court clerk had a duty to Stover to preserve funds sufficient to satisfy her claimed attorney's lien at the time the clerk transmitted the entire sum Lori had paid into the clerk's office to her former husband, Arnold. “Given our decisions regarding attorneys' liens, and harmonizing §§ 7-108 and 25-2214.01, we conclude that when an adverse party pays into the clerk of the district court such sums as will satisfy a judgment awarded against that party, and prior to the payment of such sums into the court, notice is given and an attorney's lien has attached, the district court clerk who has notice of the lien by virtue of its filing has a duty to retain that portion of the deposited funds to which an attorney's lien has attached until the ‘rightful owner’ of the sums retained can be determined” said the Court. “Under such circumstances, when the funds cannot be fully paid out, as part of the clerk's duty to ‘manage’ such funds, the clerk of the district court should notify those entities of whom the clerk is on notice who have claimed an interest in the funds, of the retention of the funds, to effectuate the determination of the ‘rightful owner.’ § 25-2214.01.”

Here, the Court noted that both the county and district courts concluded that the district court clerk had no duty to Stover in the absence of her intervention in Denison v. Denison and reached such conclusion by reliance on decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court discussing equitable intervention by attorneys seeking to enforce attorneys' liens. However, given the posture of the instant case, the lower courts “misperceived” the relevance of those decisions to the resolution of the threshold issue of whether the clerk owed Stover a duty. “We have concluded that the clerk had a duty to Stover to retain funds and that the clerk should have notified the parties or individuals claiming an interest in the retained funds” ruled the Court. “Had that occurred, intervention by Stover at that point to prove entitlement and the amount of her attorney's lien would have been appropriate.” The lower courts' reliance on the intervention cases they used to support their decisions was said to be misplaced. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

 

Child Support Guidelines, Part D, Depreciation

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This appeal of a dissolution decree contained all of the usual assignments of error but was unique in containing the Nebraska Supreme Court’s first review of child support calculation’s under an amended Part D of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Child Support Guidelines regarding depreciation not being added back for Child Support Services.

Gress v. Gress, 271 Neb. 122 (2006)

Supreme Court Headnotes

Divorce:

- [Child Custody:] When custody of a minor child is an issue in a proceeding to dissolve the marriage of the child's parents, child custody is determined by parental fitness and the child's best interests. (Child Support: Property Division: Alimony: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error.) An appellate court's review in an action for dissolution of marriage is de novo on the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. This standard of review applies to the trial court's determinations regarding custody, child support, division of property, alimony, and attorney fees.

- [Property Division:] (Proof.) The burden of proof to show that property is nonmarital remains with the person making the claim in a dissolution proceeding.

- [Attorney Fees:] (Appeal and Error.) In an action for dissolution of marriage, the award of attorney fees is discretionary with the trial court, is reviewed de novo on the record, and will be affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.

Taxation.

- As a general rule, the income of a self-employed person can be determined from his or her income tax return.

Child Custody:

- When both parents are found to be fit, the inquiry for the court is the best interests of the children. ••• In determining the best interests of the child in a custody determination, a court must consider, at a minimum, (1) the relationship of the minor child to each parent prior to the commencement of the action or any subsequent hearing; (2) the desires and wishes of the minor child if of an age of comprehension regardless of chronological age, when such desires and wishes are based on sound reasoning; (3) the general health, welfare, and social behavior of the minor child; and (4) credible evidence of abuse inflicted on any family or household member. ••• Before determining a parent's child support obligation, there must be a determination regarding the monthly incomes of the custodial and noncustodial parents.

- [Appeal and Error.] Child custody determinations are matters initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, and although reviewed de novo on the record, the trial court's determination will normally be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion.

Child Support:

- [Rules of the Supreme Court:] The Nebraska Child Support Guidelines offer flexibility and guidance, with the understanding that not every child support scenario will fit neatly into the calculation structure. (Appeal and Error.) Interpretation of the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines presents a question of law, regarding which an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the court below.

- [Taxation.] Income, for the purpose of child support, is not necessarily synonymous with taxable income.

Property Division.

- Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2004), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties' property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365. ••• Property which one party brings into the marriage is generally excluded from the marital estate. ••• Although the division of property is not subject to a precise mathematical formula, the general rule is to award a spouse one-third to one-half of the marital estate, the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of each case.

Attorney Fees.

- The award of attorney fees depends on multiple factors that include the nature of the case, the services performed and results obtained, the earning capacity of the parties, the length of time required for preparation and presentation of the case, customary charges of the bar, and the general equities of the case.

Date Filed and Case No.: March 3, 2006. No. S-05-007.

Internet Address: http://court.nol.org/opinions/2006/march/mar3/s05-007.htm

Court Appealed From: District Court for Otoe County: Daniel Bryan, Jr., Judge.

Attorneys for the Appeal: Louie M. Ligouri, of Ligouri Law Office, for Patrick Raymond Gress, appellant and cross-appellee. Stefanie S. Flodman and Steven J. Flodman for Pamela Joann Gress, appellee and cross-appellant. Gerald M. Stilmock, guardian ad litem.

Justices: Hendry, C.J., Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack, and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

Participating on Briefs: Wright, J.

Authored By: Stephan, J.

Summary: Patrick Raymond Gress. appeals to the Nebraska Supreme Court from an order of the district court for Otoe County dissolving his marriage to Pamela Joann Gress. He contested the court's order regarding custody, child and spousal support, property division, and attorney fees. Pamela cross-appealed, arguing that the duration of spousal support was inadequate. The parties were married in 1988 and had four children during the marriage. The couple's youn